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Originally Posted by noodle
Just thought i'd answer to this then leave it... The only statistics that pointed to using the bomb were the EXTREEME ones...
--A study done by Adm. Nimitz's staff in May estimated 49,000 casualties in the first 30 days, including 5,000 at sea.
--A study done by General MacArthur's staff in June estimated 23,000 in the first 30 days and 125,000 after 120 days.
When these figures were questioned by General Marshall, MacArthur submitted a revised estimate of 105,000, in part by deducting wounded men able to return to duty.
So you see, some if not most of the figures are nowhere near the 500,000.
A lot of people in the office believe that Truman had a hatdred towards the japanese and had a motive to drop the bombs.
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You do realize that the casualties stated in those reports were for US forces only, and that many more Japanese would have died as well, right? Also, those were preliminary reports, and later reports (end of July) adjusted it much higher because it was discovered that Japan was greatly reinforcing Kyushu and its homeland defenses.
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The conclusions of the 29 July intelligence estimate were:
- The rate and probable continuity of Japanese reinforcements into the Kyushu area are changing the tactical and strategic situation sharply.... we are engaged in a race against time by which the ratio of attack-effort vis-a-vis defense capacity is perilously balanced.
- The Japanese have correctly estimated southern Kyushu as a probable invasion objective, and have hastened their preparations to defend it.
- Japanese strength in southern Kyushu has grown to an estimated 206,000 troops. 7 divisions and 2 to 3 independent brigades, plus Naval, Air-Ground, and Base and Service troops.
- Unless the use of these (supply) routes is restricted by air and/or naval action ... enemy forces in southern Kyushu may be still further augmented until our planned local superiority is overcome, and the Japanese will enjoy complete freedom of action in organizing the area and in completing their preparations for defense.
This new estimate warned that if the Japanese troop deployments into Kyushu were not checked then the U.S. attack ratio may become one (1) to one (1). The figure given to Truman at the outset based on his planning called for a 3 to 1 advantage to the American invasion forces.
The suspected casualty figures were growning in mutiples of tens of thousands by the time the first A-Bomb was exploded in New Mexico. One of the impacts that this estimate had was in the mind of General Marshall, for he contemplated the possibility of using the newly developed atomic bomb against Japanese forces on Kyushu in support of the invasion instead of against Japanese cities. Japan surrendered before there were any formal revisions to the Olympic plan or new casualty estimates were made using this revised estimate of Japanese strength.
The U.S. intelligence estimates of July 1945 were alarming to Olympic planners.
They warned that the build-up of Japanese forces in southern Kyushu was reducing the U.S. attack force ratio of 3:1 to 1:1. In fact, the Japanese by this time had surpassed the 1:1 ratio and actually outnumbered the American invasion force.
In July 1945, the U.S. intelligence estimates were underestimating Japanese strength on Kyushu by about 36 percent! The underestimation of Japanese forces resulted from the continuous movement of Japanese forces into Kyushu throughout the spring and early summer of 1945.
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Atomic Bombs in WWII
This is why later projections had much higher casualty figures for both US and Japanese forces, because after the war it became apparent that they'd severely underestimated the Japanese forces on Kyushu.