sorta revived economic policys from decade ago -
02-09-2009, 10:21 PM
According to the 2008' CIA factbook dated Jan 9 08'
Japan government Economy - overview Government-industry cooperation, a strong work ethic, mastery of high technology, and a comparatively small defense allocation (1% of GDP etc. further goes on describes erosion of Japan economy. etc. subsidized argriculture sector etc.
More from CNN Money.Com dated Feb. 3 2009'
TOKYO (Reuters) -- The Bank of Japan on Tuesday pledged to spend $11 billion to buy shares held by Japanese banks to ease the pain from the global financial crisis, reviving a scheme launched earlier this decade to head off a domestic banking crisis.
The move came as a Japanese newspaper report said Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Japan's biggest bank, would post a loss for April to December and slash its annual forecasts, reflecting both stock losses and a rise in bad debts.
The Nikkei stock average rose after the BOJ decision, while the yen fell broadly on hopes the central bank buying would ease risk aversion.
But some analysts questioned if the central bank stock buying would do much to help an economy already slipping deep into recession.
Below why Bank of Japan( BoJ)/ Japan Gov. failed note date BoJ is Bank of Japan.
Janet Yellen, President of San Francisco Fed, in a recent speech summarises all the measures taken by Fed in response to the crisis. She explains all the various alphabetical soup programs - TAF, PDCF, TSLF, AMLF, MMIFF etc in a nice simple manner.
And why BoJ policy did not work?
January 6, 2009
The theory underlying the Bank of Japan’s intervention was that banks might be encouraged to lend by replacing their holdings of short-term government securities with excess cash.
Understanding various Fed measures and difference from Bank of Japan measures
Then she explains how Fed policies are similar and different from BoJ. The similarity is:
The main similarity is that the Fed, like the Bank of Japan, has increased the quantity of excess reserves in the banking system well above the minimum level required to push overnight interbank lending rates to the vicinity of zero.
The problem with this idea is that, near the zero bound, short-term government securities and cash are almost perfect substitutes—both are essentially riskless assets that yield a zero or near-zero rate of return; thus, exchanging one for the other should have little effect on banks’ desire to lend.
Indeed, the Japanese experience during their quantitative easing program in the early 2000s suggests that simply expanding excess bank reserves—even by a very large amount—had little effect on bank lending or on the economy more broadly. The policy may have lowered longer-term borrowing rates, however, by symbolizing and highlighting the Bank of Japan’s commitment to fighting deflation by holding its short-term interest rate at zero for an extended time—until deflationary pressures had been convincingly dissipated.
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